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OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES UNDER WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWSt
Arthur Larson*
The earliest workmen's compensation statutes in this country
typically provided compensation only for industrial accidents. Cov-
erage for occupational diseases developed slowly. There have been
various reasons for this lag.' One was the opinion in some jurisdic-
tions that, while accidental injuries were known to the common law
and could be made the subject of an action for damages, the concept
of occupational diseases was a stranger to the lexicon of the precom-
pensation-era common law. 2 To the extent that workmen's compen-
sation acts substituted nonfault liability for the kind of injuries that
were potential subjects of fault liability, there was thought to be no
place for occupational diseases,3 which, in the sense of a disease due
to the "normal" conditions of the industry, as distinguished from
the negligence of the employer, had consistently been held incapa-
ble of supporting a common law action.4 Another occasion for hesita-
t Copyright e 1973, by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., and reprinted, with revisions
by the author, with permission, from A. LARSON, WORuoEx'S COMPENSATMON LAW (1973).
* Professor of Law, Duke University; Director, Rule of Law Research Center, Durham,
North Carolina; B.A., Augustana College, 1931; B.A. (Jurisp.), Oxford, 1935; D.C.L., Oxford,
1958.
1. The lag, which has diminished rapidly in recent years, now consists not only in continu-
ing incompleteness of coverage in some states, but in a variety of limitations and restrictions,
including requirements that disability or death occur within a specific time of exposure or
employment, absence of benefits for partial disability, and restricted medical payments. See
text accompanying notes 124-148 for a discussion of these limitations, and text accompanying
notes 115-123 for a survey of legislative expansion of coverage.
2. Boshuizen v. Thompson & Taylor Co., 360 Ill. 160, 195 N.E. 625 (1935). In finding
Section 1 of the 1911 Occupational Disease Act of Illinois unconstitutional, the court said:
"This type of legislation was a complete stranger to the common law and section 1 under
consideration here has no common-law origin or history." Id. at 162, 195 N.E. at 626-27. The
Occupational Disease Act was later held constitutional as a reasonable exercise of the police
power in People ex rel. Radium Dial Co. v. Ryan, 371 ill. 597, 21 N.E.2d 749 (1939).
3. Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Works, 182 Mich. 157, 148 N.W. 485 (1914). The
court said: "We are not able to find a single case where an employee has recovered compensa-
tion for an occupational disease at common law." Id. at 159, 148 N.W. at 486. When the
disease was attributable to the employer's negligence, however, every state that passed on
the question except Michigan and Illinois recognized the possibility of an action for damages.
Thirty cases supporting this statement are collected in Banks, Employer's Liability for Occu-
pational Diseases, 16 ROcKY MT. L. REv. 60, 61, n.5 (1944).
4. Miller v. American Steel & Wire Co., 90 Conn. 349, 97 A. 345 (1916); Industrial Comm'n
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tion was uncertainty as to whether a problem as generalized and
extensive as occupational disease could be more effectively and ap-
propriately dealt with under workmen's compensation or general
health insurance legislation.' Finally, the obstacle which has been
the most practical and persistent is the argument, discussed later
in connection with the prime example of silicosis,' that the heavy
incidence of certain diseases in particular industries or areas would
make their full coverage an impossible burden on the compensation
system.
These arguments, however, have not prevented the inclusion of
occupational disease coverage in workmen's compensation statutes,
for today all fifty states provide some measure of recovery for occu-
pational diseases. Forty-one states, 7 Puerto Rico, Guam, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the Federal Employees' Act, and the Longshore-
men's Act have general coverage; that is, they cover all occupational
diseases, sometimes by general definition of the term,8 sometimes
under a broad use of the term "injury,"9 sometimes under an unre-
stricted coverage of disease, 0 and sometimes by an entirely separate
act." Nine states12 cover specified diseases ranging from as few as
v. Monroe, 111 Ohio St. 812, 146 N.E. 213 (1924); Gordon v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 287 S.W.
911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Calhoun v. Washington Veneer Co., 170 Wash. 512, 15 P.2d 943
(1932).
5. REPORT OF ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES to Governor Charles Deneen
(1911).
6. See text following note 125 infra.
7. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Virginia permits an election between listed or general occupational disease cover-
age.
8. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-275 (Cum. Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.151
(Cum. Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.011 (Cum. Supp. 1974); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-
151 (1968); ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.802 (1973).
9. E.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 8101 (1967); CAL. LABOR CODE § 3208 (Cum. Supp. West 1974); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 1 (1965). Michigan specifically defines "personal injury" in such
a way as to include occupational diseases, without actually using the phrase "occupational
disease." See text accompanying note 34 infra.
10. E.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 3208 (Cum. Supp. West 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02
(Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.18 (1957).
11. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.36 et seq. (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1974); IND. STAT.
ANN. § 22-3-7-1 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1201 et seq. (Cum. Supp.
1974).
12. Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Vermont, and
Wyoming.
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twelve in Kansas' 3 to as many as forty-seven in Colorado.14
It is interesting to observe, however, that the earliest kind of
occupational disease coverage in the United States took the form of
general inclusion within either the term "injury," as in the Massa-
chusetts,1 5 Federal Employees"' and California acts,'7 or within the
term "disease," as in the California' s and Wisconsin'9 acts. It was
not until 1920 that New York adopted the first schedule-type act,2
following the English practice of listing not only particular diseases
but the process in which they are acquired. While the schedule
method was once widely copied, the trend has been toward expan-
sion into general coverage, either by abandoning the schedule alto-
gether, or, as was done in New York, Ohio, and, more recently,
Nevada, by leaving the list intact while stating that the act also
covers all other occupational diseases. The purpose of including a
description of the "process" appears to be to establish a strong
presumption that the contraction of that disease by one engaged in
that process was attributable to the employment, while the contrac-
tion of the same disease in another process would require definite
affirmative proof of causal connection. 2' The value of such a pre-
13. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-5a01 (1973).
14. COLO. REV. STAT. § 81-18 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1972). The restricted character of sched-
ule coverage has elicited much criticism and controversy. For a presentation of the view that
coverage should be general, and that schedule lists, even under the most inclusive schedules,
are falling short of current industrial diseases, see the address of Mr. Ashley St. Clair,
Counsel, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., Boston, Mass., Proceedings of the 35th Annual
Convention of the International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions,
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Standards Bull. No. 119, p. 70 (1949). For a presenta-
tion of the view favoring schedules, see Angerstein, Legal Aspects of Occupational Disease,
18 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 240 (1946).
For a good example of an obvious miscarriage of justice and defeat of the purposes of
compensation legislation because of the technical limitations of a specific occupational dis-
ease list, see Ridley Packing Co. v. Holliday, 467 P.2d 480 (Okla. 1970).
15. In re Hurle, 217 Mass. 223, 104 N.E. 336 (1914) ("injury" interpreted to include blind-
ing by long exposure to coal gas); Johnson v. London Guar. & Accident Co., 217 Mass. 388,
104 N.E. 735 (1914) (lead poisoning).
16. 33 Op. A'rr'y GEN. 476 (1923); 27 Op. ATr'y GEN. 346 (1909).
17. California deleted the accident requirement in 1915. CAL. STAT. ch. 607, § 2 (1915).
18. CAL. STAT. ch. 586, § 3(4) (1917).
19. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.01(2) (1931).
20. N.Y. LAWS 1920, ch. 538.
21. Home Office Memorandum on the English Workmen's Compensation Acts, 1925-1943
(June 1944). But cf. Collins v. Nat'l Aniline Div., Allied Chem. and Dye Corp., 8 App. Div.
2d 900, 186 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1959). See also note 39 infra.
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sumption probably explains the retention of both schedule and gen-
eral coverage in New York, Ohio, and Nevada.
I. DEFINITION OF "OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE"
Definitions of "occupational disease" should always be checked
against the purpose for which they were uttered. Among the pur-
poses for which definitions have been formulated are: defeating
compensation because an injury is not an accident, but an occupa-
tional disease in jurisdictions which had at the time of the decision
no occupational disease coverage; getting around the exclusive cov-
erage provisions of the compensation act so as to sue for damages
under a statute relating to safe working conditions; 22 limiting bene-
fits or applying unusual procedural rules in those states where spe-
cial restrictions are placed on occupational diseases, but not on
accidents; and, finally, getting awards for occupational disease
under general definitions of the term, as against the contention that
the disease is an ordinary nonindustrial illness.
Of these, only the last is presently in point. The rest are concerned
with the contrast between accident and occupational disease. In a
large proportion of the cases involving this contrast, the tag "occu-
pational disease" was synonymous with the verdict "noncompensa-
ble." With the expansion of occupational disease legislation, this
contrast between accident and occupational disease has lost most
of its importance, and awards are frequently made without specify-
ing which category the injury falls in. The two crucial points of
distinction between accident and occupational disease were the ele-
ment of unexpectedness and the matter of time-definiteness. What
set occupational diseases apart from accidental injuries was both
the fact that they could not honestly be said to be unexpected, since
they were recognized as an inherent hazard of continued exposure
to conditions of the particular employment,2 and the fact that they
were gradual rather than sudden in onset. Thus, what could ordinar-
ily be an occupational disease might be converted into an accident
22. For a rare example in this category, see Perez v. Blumenthal Bros. Chocolate Co., 428
Pa. 225, 237 A.2d 227 (1968).
23. Industrial Comm'n v. Roth, 98 Ohio St. 34, 120 N.E. 172 (1918):
A disease contracted in the usual and ordinary course of events, which from the
common experience of humanity is known to be incident to a particular employment
is an occupational disease. . . . Id. at 35, 120 N.E. at 173.
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by an unusual and sudden dosage of the same kind of dust or fumes
that, absorbed gradually over a long period, would produce a typical
industrial disease.2 1 Similiarly, occupational disease might be trans-
formed into an accident by the presence of some untoward little
incident, breakage or abnormality, like getting anthrax through a
scratch,2 or absorbing harmful fumes because of a defective gas
mask.2 6 Some courts have found accidental quality when a typical
occupational disease was contracted because the employer had not
taken all possible steps to eliminate harmful conditions in his plant.
Occupational disease, in this view, included only the effects of con-
ditions which were normal in the sense that "science and industry
have not yet learned how to eliminate" them.27 These considerations
relate to the question of accident versus occupational disease, when
the effect of inclusion within the latter term is the defeat of the
claim.
Now that compensation may be had for both accident and occu-
pational disease, the new definitional question has become the loca-
tion of a boundry line separating occupational disease from diseases
that are neither accidental nor occupational, but common to man-
kind and not distinctively associated with the employment. For this
purpose a new set of standards must be used. It is of little value,
and, indeed, may be quite misleading, to quote indiscriminately
24. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 162 Colo. 68, 424 P.2d 382 (1967);
Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 154 Colo. 240, 392 P.2d 174 (1964); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Bradford, 381 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). For an illustration
of an opinion drawing this contrast, see Chapman v. Industrial Comm'n, 52 Ohio L. Abs. 9,
81 N.E.2d 626 (1948), distinguishing Industrial Comm'n v. Bartholome, 128 Ohio St. 13, 190
N.E. 193 (1934).
25. Hiers v. Hull & Co., 178 App. Div. 350, 164 N.Y. Supp. 767 (1917); Mid-South Packers,
Inc. v. Hanson, 253 Miss. 703, 178 So.2d 689 (1965). See generally as to the "repeated-
impact" theory, A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 39.40 (1973) (hereinafter cited
as LARsON).
26. Dailey v. River Raisin Paper Co., 269 Mich. 443, 257 N.W. 857 (1934).
27. Cell v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 281 Mich. 564, 567, 275 N.W. 250, 252 (1937). See Gay
v. Hocking Coal Co., 184 Iowa 949, 169 N.W. 360 (1918) and Pero v. Collier-Latimer, Inc., 49
Wyo. 131, 52 P.2d 690 (1935) (holding that silicosis acquired over a three-month period was
an accidental injury, because the harmful conditions could have been eliminated by the use
of proper precautions). But cf. Oggesen v. General Cable Corp., 273 F.2d 331 (8th Cir. 1960)
(negligence action based upon "safe work place" allegations dismissed since injury was
occupational and recovery could be had only under the applicable statute).
See generally as to the contrast between accident and occupational disease, LARSON §§ 39-
40.
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from old definitions, the purpose of which was merely to distinguish
accident from occupational disease.
A number of statutes contain detailed definitions of the term"occupational disease," and these definitions provide the clue to the
distinction which is controlling for present purposes. The common
element running through all these definitions is the distinctive rela-
tion of the particular disease to the nature of the employment, as
contrasted with diseases which might just as readily be contracted
in other occupations or in everyday life. It will be observed at once
that this test resembles the original "peculiar risk" test for the"arising out of employment" requirement. Indeed, several statutes,
including those of Wisconsin, 2 Massachusetts, 29 and Californial°
appear to rely on the limitations imposed by the general test of
causal relation rather than on a detailed statutory definition.
The most elaborate statutory definition is that of Virginia,3' which
is essentially the same as those of Illinois 2 and Indiana, 33 which
casts the definition almost entirely in terms of the "arising" test:
As used in this Act, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise,
the term 'occupational disease' means a disease arising out of and in
the course of the employment. No ordinary disease of life to which
the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall be
compensable, except:
(1) When it follows as an incident of occupational disease as
defined in this title; or
(2) When it is an infectious or contagious disease contracted
in the course of employment in a hospital or sanitarium or pub-
lic health laboratory.
A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment only if
there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the
circumstances:
(1) A direct causal connection between the conditions under
which work is performed and the occupational disease,
28. "'[Ilnjury' is mental or physical harm to an employee caused by accident or disease
. ... Wis. STAT. Am. § 102.01(2) (1973).
29. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 152.1 (1973).
30. "'Injury' includes an injury or disease arising out of the employment. .. "CAL. LABOR
CODE § 3208 (cum. Supp. West 1974).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-46 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
32. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.36 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1974).
33. IND. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-7-10 (1974).
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(2) It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the
work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the
employment,
(3) It can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate
cause,
(4) It does not come from a hazard to which workmen would
have been equally exposed outside of the employment,
(5) It is incidental to the character of the business and not
independent of the relation of employer and employee, and,
(6) It must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected
with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a
natural consequence, though it need not have been foreseen or
expected before its contraction.
Another representative definition, containing phrases which ap-
pear in a number of statutes, is Michigan's:34
"Personal injury" shall include a disease or disability which is due
to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to
the business of the employer and which arises out of and in the course
of employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the public is gener-
ally exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable.
An even shorter definition is Connecticut's:
"Occupational disease" includes any disease peculiar to the occu-
pation in which the employee was engaged and due to causes in
excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as such. ...
Most statutory definitions are similar in substance to these, and,
when a statute contains no definition at all, the judicial definition,
designed to describe the inclusiveness of the term, will be found to
stress the same elements. The New York Court of Appeals, for ex-
ample, has supplied the following guide to the meaning of the unde-
fined term "occupational disease" in the New York act. This guide
stresses, as does the Connecticut definition, the contrast with risks
of other employment:
An ailment does not become an occupational disease simply be-
cause it is contracted on the employer's premises. It must be one
34. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 417.1(c) (1967).
35. CONN. GEN. STATS. REV. § 31-275 (1972).
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which is commonly regarded as natural to, inhering in, an incident
and concomitant of, the work in question. There must be a recogniza-
ble link between the disease and some distinctive feature of the
claimant's job, common to all jobs of that sort. As this court observed
in Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., 276 N.Y. 313, 318, 319, 12 N.E.2d
311, 313, an occupational disease is one "which results from the na-
ture of the employment, and by nature is meant . . . conditions to
which all employees of a class are subject, and which produce the
disease as a natural incident of a particular occupation, and attach
to that occupation a hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run
of occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending employment
in general."36
The distinctive element of an occupational disease is that such
diseases are not as readily contracted in everyday life or in other
occupations. A little reflection will indicate that there are no signifi-
cant differences between the two norms commonly used in statutory
definitions, that of the exposures of nonemployment everyday life,
as in the Virginia or Michigan type definition, and the exposures
encountered through employment in other occupations, as in the
Connecticut and New York versions. The infinite variety of condi-
tions of other employment-ranging from accounting to lead mining
and from baby-sitting to topping Douglas fir trees-is just as great
as the variety of conditions of nonemployment life, and has no more
of a common element than does "everyday life" to supply a measur-
ing stick by which to judge what is "ordinary" and what is distinc-
tively occupational in a particular employment.
If the employment is attended with unusual germs, 37 poisons,
chemicals, fumes, dusts, or similar conditions, the problem of satis-
fying the distinction from the "ordinary" is not serious.38 Contro-
36. Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp. 298 N.Y. 285, 288, 82 N.E.2d 785, 786 (1948).
37. Board of Nat'l Missions v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 116 F. Supp. 625 (D. Alas. 1953)
(tuberculosis rate in Alaska is about 10 times that of the average state; thus a missionary
claimant was exposed more frequently than the public). See generally as to this type of case
the discussion at text accompanying notes 80-82 infra.
38. Woodward Iron Co. v. King, 268 Ala. 680, 110 So. 2d 270 (1959); Schwitzer-Cummins
Co. v. Hacker, 123 Ind. App. 674, 112 N.E.2d 221 (1953); Smith v. Humboldt Dye Works,
Inc., 34 App. Div. 2d 1041, 312 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1970); Ciampa v. Tripp Plating Co., 3 App.
Div. 2d 621, 158 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1956); Daniels v. Mason, Johnson & MacLean, 9 App. Div. 2d
812, 192 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1959); Allied Materials Corp. v. Thompson, 346 P.2d 945 (Okla. 1959);
United Paint Co. v. Tillman, 213 Tenn. 187, 373 S.W.2d 438 (1963).
[Vol. 9: 87
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verted or unsuccessful claims will usually be found to involve, not
the definition,39 but a problem of proof: whether these employment
conditions in fact produced this disability. 0 For example, nitric,
sulphuric, and chromic acid4' fumes would abundantly satisfy any
requirement of nonordinary risks, but compensation for cancer of
the lungs was denied for the death of a man exposed to such fumes
on the ground of lack of causal relation, and in view of the fact that
the decedent had smoked twenty to forty cigarettes a day for forty
years. 2
39. For a case involving a definition, see Morrison v. Allied Chem. Corp., 217 Pa. Super.
784, 269 A.2d 525 (1970), wherein claimant contracted industrial poisoning as the result of
his employment, which exposed him to numerous chemicals. He failed, however, to show that
the disease was peculiar to his occupation or industry. Compensation was denied, even though
claimant's disease was one of those enumerated in the statute. The statute required that the
occupational disease be both one enumerated in the act and one "peculiar to the occupation
or industry in which the employee was engaged, and not common to the general population."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1401(c) (Cum. Supp. 1974). This section is ambiguous because it
could be construed as meaning that the disease must be peculiar to the occupation or industry
in the sense that it is not common to the general public. But-although this is not clear from
the opinion-the court seems to be treating the two parts of the restriction as independent.
That is, it may not be enough to show that the disease was not common to the general public.
It may be necessary to show also that, while the disease is not common to the public, it is
not found in other industries and occupations. If this is indeed the interpretation being
followed, it is a preposterous distortion of the concept of occupational disease. Should a
worker in a chemical plant be denied benefits for benzol poisoning because benzol poisoning
might also affect a worker in a research laboratory or in a manufacturing plant employing
benzol? Yet the alternative to assuming this senseless restriction must be to assume that
benzol poisoning producing total disability is a disease common to the general public, which
is even more ridiculous.
See Collins v. National Aniline Div., Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 8 App. Div. 2d 900, 186
N.Y.S.2d 979 (1959) (decedent's condition was not caused by exposure to benzol or its deriva-
tives but instead attributed to another chemical not within the language of the statute;
compensation denied).
40. Knott Coal Corp. v. Smith, 354 S.W.2d 513 (Ky. 1962); Pace v. Louisville Crushed
Stone Co., 328 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. 1959); Anderson v. Southern Fabricators Corp., 160 So. 2d
438 (La. App. 1964); Brown v. Armour & Co., 168 Neb. 835, 97 N.W.2d 342 (1959); Leiser v.
Saks Fifth Ave., 9 App. Div. 2d 832, 192 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1959); Ashley v. Mardon Operating
Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 826, 192 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1959).
41. Mutual Chem. Co. v. Thurston, 222 Md. 86, 158 A.2d 899 (1960).
42. Amoroso v. Tubular & Cast Prods. Mfg. Co., 13 N.Y.2d 992, 194 N.E.2d 694, 244
N.Y.S.2d 787 (1963). Cf. Bolger v. Chris Anderson Roofing Co., 112 N.J. Super. 383, 271 A.2d
451 (1970), aff'd, 117 N.J. Super. 497, 285 A.2d 228 (1971) (compensation granted, since even
if smoking contributed to the development of cancer, the occupational exposure contributed
in a major way to the onset or precipitation of the cancer); McAllister v. Workmen's Compen-
sation Appeals Bd., 6 Cal.2d 408, 445 P.2d 313, 71 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1968) (compensation
awarded for a fireman's lung cancer, when smoke inhalation from both fire fighting and
cigarette smoking were involved).
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The conditions of employment, however, which distinguish occu-
pational diseases from ordinary diseases of life need not be unusual
chemicals or fumes. They may be distinctive because familiar
harmful elements are present in an unusual degree. For example,
exposure to change in temperature is common to all life and employ-
ment. A moderate amount of it, resulting in splotches on the legs
of a theatre ticket seller, has therefore been held not to render that
condition an occupational disease. 3 But in the same state the con-
traction of rheumatoid arthritis has been held occupational when it
resulted from continued handling of ice and iced vegetables by a
worker in a wholesale market." Likewise, a butcher's pulmonary
emphysema has been recognized as an occupational disease, al-
though the disease itself is common to mankind, because of the
causal relation to the employment hazard of breathing refrigerated
air.45
Just as chills and temperature changes are features of everyday
life, so are bumps, jars, jolts, and strains-within limits. But re-
peated strains, if associated with employment, may supply the dis-
tinctive element necessary to make a back injury occupational.'
Tenosynovitis suffered by an employee whose work consisted of lift-
ing and moving boxes and using a hammer and drill, causing her to
twist her shoulder and move her arm back and forth, has been held
to be an occupational disease, even though a housewife might con-
tract the disease in the course of certain household duties." Bursitis
43. Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., 276 N.Y. 313, 12 N.E.2d 311 (1938). Accord, Brooks v.
State Dep't of Transp., 225 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1971); Berry v. Owensboro Ice Cream & Dairy
Prods., 376 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1964). See Snir v. J. W. Mays, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 373, 227 N.E.2d
40, 280 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1967).
44. Peloso v. D'Alessio Bros., 272 App. Div. 984, 72 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1947), aff'd, 298 N.Y.
582, 81 N.E.2d 111 (1948). Accord, Erb v. Sheffield Farms Co., 272 App. Div. 1082, 74
N.Y.S.2d 555 (1947).
45. Roettinger v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 17 App. Div. 2d 76, 230 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1962).
Cf. Fitch v. Princess Coals, Inc., 463 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1971) (chronic bronchitis held not to
be an occupational disease, since it is a disorder that the population generally is exposed to);
Bess v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 469 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. App. 1971).
46. Buchanan v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 278 App. Div. 594, 101 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1951), afl'd,
302 N.Y. 848, 100 N.E.2d 45 (1951). Similar situations and holdings can be found in: Fruehauf
Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 68 Cal. 2d 569, 440 P.2d 236, 68 Cal. Rptr.
164 (1968); Underwood v. National Motor Castings Div., 329 Mich. 273, 45 N.W.2d 286
(1951); DeBella v. Hotel Windsor, 284 App. Div. 919, 134 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1954); Nicoletti v.
S.H. Pomeroy Co., 283 App. Div. 1129, 131 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1954).
47. Briggs v. Hope's Windows, 284 App. Div. 1077, 136 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1954). Accord, Guardi
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of the shoulder from pushing a lever 500 to 700 times a day has been
held compensable under a statute defining occupational diseases as
including those "due to causes and conditions. . . characteristic of
or peculiar to the employment." '48
Indeed, although walking and sitting might be thought to be
about as ordinary as anything in everyday life, an award has been
made to a waiter who developed varicose veins after twenty-five
years of working on hard-surfaced floors,49 and to an employee who
became afflicted with bursitis of the tail bone from sitting on a steel
chair."
On the other hand, New York, which accounts for many of the
awards of this type, has refused compensation for thrombophlebitis
caused by repeated jarrings as the result of having to jump down
from a platform repeatedly for several weeks.- New Jersey, which
made the award for shoulder bursitis just mentioned, in the same
year ruled out tenosynovitis suffered by an employee who for six
months pushed cardboard into a sewing machine, as not peculiar to
or characteristic of the employee's employment conditions.12 Utah
has refused to include osteoarthritis of the finger joints allegedly
caused by seventeen years of legal typing. 3
It is inevitable that the application of the standards of "everyday
life" or "other occupations" should produce some controversial dis-
v. General Elec. Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 738, 291 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1968) (rheumatoid arthritis);
Preusser v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 4 App. Div. 2d 727, 163 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1957), aff'd,
4 N.Y.2d 773, 149 N.E.2d 339, 172 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1958) (Kienbock's disease).
48. Bondar v. Simmons Co., 23 N.J. Super. 109, 92 A.2d 642 (1952), aff'd, 12 N.J. 361, 96
A.2d 795 (1953).
See Frank v. Friedman Die Cutters, 281 App. Div. 934, 119 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1953), aff'd, 306
N.Y. 935, 119 N.E.2d 608 (1954) (bursitis contracted as a result of repeatedly lifting and
moving boxes was held to be an occupational disease).
49. Wildermuth v. B.P.O. Elks Club, 5 App. Div. 2d 911, 170 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1958). But cf.
Elkin v. D. & J. Cleaners, Inc., 14 App. Div. 2d 402, 221 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1961) (the court denied
the claim, but remanded for determination of whether development of varicose veins was an
effect of work as a presser at a cleaners and whether or not his particular work activity was
sufficiently distinctive to render the condition occupational in nature).
50. Brown Shoe Co. v. Fooks, 228 Ark. 815, 310 S.W.2d 816 (1958) (three judges dissented
on the ground that sitting was not peculiar to the employment).
51. Champion v. W. & L. E. Gurley, '99 N.Y. 406, 87 N.E.2d 430 (1949), rev'g 274 App.
Div. 863, 82 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1948).
52. Fernandez v. Kiernan-Hughes Co., 23 N.J. Super. 394, 93 A.2d 41 (1952).
53. Edlund v. Industrial Comm'n, 122 Utah 238, 248 P.2d 365 (1952). See Popham v.
Industrial Comm'n, 5 Ohio St. 2d 85, 214 N.E.2d 80 (1966).
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tinctions. For example, a pair of Michigan cases, both involving
injury from muscular exertion, illustrates how shadowy the line may
become. In Carter v. International Detrola Corp. ,5 the claimant had
to tip 125-pound boxes on edge to inspect them as they came past
her on the assembly line. She developed a progressive swelling and
stiffening of the arms and hands from this exertion, which finally
disabled her. In denying recovery the court said:
Plaintiff did manual work which required the continuous use of her
arms. In this respect it was no different than many other factory jobs.
The resulting excessive movement of the scalenus anticus muscle is
not so unique as to be 'characteristic of and peculiar to the business
of the employer.' Muscle use is common to most other employments,
and the act does not permit compensation for injuries caused by this
alone.15
A few months later, in Underwood v. National Motor Castings
Division,5" the same court was confronted by another female claim-
ant who had been doing lifting that was too heavy for her. In this
case, the job was to carry 40-pound castings and put them in an
oven. This involved both lifting and stooping, and resulted in a
lumbo-sacral strain with a possibility of an intervetebral disc her-
niation. The Commission found:
Her work presented a substantial hazard of back injury which was
far in excess of that attending employment in general. The heavy and
strenuous nature of her employment constituted causes and condi-
tions which were characteristic of and peculiar to the defendant's
business.57
The employer appealed on the ground that "plaintiff was not
subjected to any greater hazard of injury by her work than would
be found in employment in general, 5 8 but the court affirmed, say-
ing:
The phrase, "peculiar to the occupation," is not here used in the
sense that the disease must be one which originates exclusively from
54. 328 Mich. 367, 43 N.W.2d 890 (1950).
55. Id. at 369, 43 N.W.2d at 891.
56. 329 Mich. 273, 45 N.W.2d 286 (1951).
57. Id. at 274, 45 N.W.2d at 287.
58. Id.
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the particular kind of employment in which the employee is engaged,
but rather in the sense that the conditions of that employment must
result in a hazard which distinguishes it in character from the general
run of occupations. . . .'
The Court went on to say:
The bending and twisting that plaintiff was required to do in order
to place the cores in the oven was a part of her job and peculiar to
defendant's business.60
The character of the risk, then, need not be "unique," although
that word had been used in the excerpt from the Carter opinion
quoted above.
The Underwood approach seems to have carried the day in Michi-
gan, having been expressly followed in two later cases, one involving
an intervertebral disc injury caused by lifting and carrying molds
weighing 20 to 100 pounds,6' and the other awarding compensation
for lumbar strain from lifting heavy wheels weighing 40 pounds from
a conveyor and placing them on a skid on the floor behind the
worker.2
II. JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF THE OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CONCEPT
Under schedule-type occupational disease statutes, there is rela-
tively little occasion for judicial interpretation of the extent of cov-
erage, although occasionally a question may arise as to what is
included within some such generic term as "poisoning,"63 or on how
wide a range of similar or related conditions a named disease em-
braces. Tennessee, for example, has held that silicosis includes
pulmonary fibrosis,64 and that contact dermatitis includes
59. Id. at 275, 45 N.W.2d at 287, quoting Samels v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 317 Mich.
149, 154, 26 N.W.2d 742, 745 (1947).
60. Underwood v. National Motor Casting Div., 329 Mich. 273, 276, 45 N.W.2d 286, 288
(1951).
61. Fields v. G. M. Brass & Aluminum Foundry Co., 332 Mich. 113, 50 N.W.2d 738 (1952).
62. Gibbs v. Motor Wheel Corp., 333 Mich. 617, 53 N.W.2d 573 (1952).
63. Watkins v. National Elec. Prods. Corp., 165 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1948).
64. Whitehead v. Holston Defense Corp., 205 Tenn. 326, 326 S.W.2d 482 (1959), wherein
the court stated:
Some diseases are so closely related to certain classified diseases that they must be
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panniculitis and dermatomyositis 5
The schedule list is exclusive, and it is not within the power of
the courts to add new items, however obvious an occupational dis-
ease the omitted item may be.6" But when the statute contains a
general coverage of occupational diseases, with or without a sched-
ule or definition, the courts are confronted with the continuing task
of inclusion and exclusion of borderline diseases.
Some of the inclusions show a disposition to go somewhat beyond
the earlier conventional notion of the typical lead poisoning or sili-
cosis type of occupational disease. The term "disease" is construed
in its broadest sense of an "impairment of the normal state" or
"disorder or derangement of an organism. 6 7 Thus, back strain and
herniated disc,68 flat feet,69 deterioration of a toe joint, 0 bursitis,7'
rheumatoid arthritis, 72 sciatic neuritis,73 tenosynovitis, 74 varicosity, 75
denominated as "occupational", provided the elements of causation can be connected,
either directly or indirectly, with the conditions under which an employee is required
to work. Id. at 331, 326 S.W.2d at 485.
See Buck Simmons Auto & Elec. Supply Co. v. Kesterson, 194 Tenn. 115, 250 S.W.2d 39
(1952) and Smith v. Tennessee Furniture Indus., Inc., 208 Tenn. 608, 348 S.W.2d 290 (1961),
whose broad interpretation of the Tennessee statute is apparently calculated to offset in some
measure the unusually short schedule list. But cf. Knoxville Poultry & Egg Co. v. Robinson,
477 S.W.2d 515 (Tenn. 1972). See also Amato v. Heywood Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 536, 206
N.Y.S.2d 626 (1960).
65. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Miller, 210 Tenn. 301, 358 S.W.2d 316 (1962).
66. Miceli v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 157 Colo. 204, 401 P.2d 835 (1965); Cornish
v. J. R. Simplot Fertilizer Co., 86 Idaho 79, 383 P.2d 333 (1963); Hicks v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 165 So. 2d 51 (La. App. 1964); Collins v. National Aniline Div., Allied Chem. & Dye
Corp., 8 App. Div. 2d 900, 186 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1959); Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co.,
231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E.2d 760 (1950); Asten Hill Mfg. Co. v. Bambrick, 5 Pa. 664, 291 A.2d
354 (1972).
67. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961 ed.)
68. Freuhauf Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 68 Cal. 2d 569, 440 P.2d 236,
68 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1968); Underwood v. National Motor Castings Div., 329 Mich. 273, 45
N.W.2d 286 (1951); Goyer v. Fred. K. Blanchard, Inc., 25 App. Div. 2d 892, 269 N.Y.S.2d
338 (1966); Fellows v. Syracuse Supply Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 791, 263 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1965);
Ross v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 24 App. Div. 2d 670, 261 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1965); Buchanan
v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 278 App. Div. 594, 101 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1951), affd, 302 N.Y. 848,
100 N.E.2d 45 (1951). See also notes 43 to 62 supra, for a number of related examples.
69. Townsend v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 282 App. Div. 968, 125 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1953).
70. Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 101 N.W.2d 200 (1960).
71. Bondar v. Simmons Co., 23 N.J. Super. 109, 92 A.2d 642 (1952), affd, 12 N.J. 361, 96
A.2d 795 (1953).
72. Guardi v. General Elec. Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 738, 291 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1968).
73. Krauss v. Marcel Wagner Glove Co., 32 App. Div. 2d 600, 299 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1969).
74. National Stores, Inc. v. Hester, 393 S.W.2d 603 (Ky. 1965).
75. Elkin v. D. & J. Cleaners, Inc., 25 App. Div. 2d 790, 269 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1966); Vines v.
Lazar Motors, 277 App. Div. 1083, 100 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1950).
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effeminacy and impotency, 7 enlarged heart, 7  and loss of hearing,78
have been held compensable as occupational diseases, when pro-
duced or aggravated by the distinctive conditions or exertions of the
employment.
Moreover, the element of gradualness, so heavily stressed in defi-
nitions contrived to distinguish accident, loses its importance when
the sole question is the inclusiveness of an occupational disease
statute. Where conditions of employment produce outright infec-
tion, for example, it may be treated as an occupational disease
although the process is much more sudden than that described in
the older definitions. The contraction of tuberculosis by a telephone
operator through contact with an infected mouthpiece,79 the con-
traction of tuberculosis by nurses, 8 dishwashers, '8 1 or others8 2 in hos-
pitals or sanitoria, and the onset of pneumonia from the compara-
tively brief exposure suffered by a taxi driver while trying to extri-
cate his taxi from the mudl have all been compensated.8 4
A disease which might otherwise be thought clearly nonoccupa-
tional may become occupational because the employment facili-
tates its transmission. Mason v. Young Women's Christian
Association is the best example of this development. Ordinarily
one would not think of tuberculosis as an occupational disease of
telephone operators; but if the enforced use of a close-fitting mouth-
76. Stepnowski v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 18 N.J. Super. 495, 87 A.2d 546 (1952).
77. Eckert v. Commander Larabee Mfg. Co., 278 App. Div. 623, 101 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1951).
78. Green Bay Drop Forge Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 265 Wis. 38, 60 N.W.2d 409 (1953),
rehearing denied, 265 Wis. 38, 61 N.W.2d 847 (1953). The subject of loss of hearing presents
a number of questions too specialized for a general article on occupational diseases. For a
detailed discussion, see LARSON § 41.50.
79. Mason v. Y.W.C.A., 271 App. Div. 1042, 68 N.Y.S.2d 510, motion for leave to appeal
denied, 297 N.Y. 1037, 74 N.E.2d 486 (1947).
80. Otten v. State, 229 Minn. 488, 40 N.W.2d 81 (1949); Hayes v. St. Mary's Hosp., 285
App. Div. 914, 137 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1955); Pogue v. Crouse Irving Hosp., 281 App. Div. 931,
119 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1953); Quallenberg v. Union Health Center, 280 App. Div. 1029, 117
N.Y.S.2d 24 (1952).
81. Mills v. Detroit Tuberculosis Sanitarium, 323 Mich. 200, 35 N.W.2d 239 (1948).
82. Board of Nat'l Missions v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 116 F. Supp. 625 (D. Alaska 1953). See
note 37 supra.
83. Feist v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 42 N.W.2d 665 (N.D. 1950).
Accord, Shore v. Pacific Employers' Ins. Co., 102 Ga. App. 431, 116 S.E.2d 526 (1960).
84. See also LAasON § 8.50 for a number of similar cases presenting the "arising-out-of-
employment" issue.
85. 271 App. Div. 1042, 68 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1947).
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piece is an inherent part of the job, and if such use enhances the
probability of transmission of the disease from one operator to an-
other, then apparently the distinctiveness of the mechanism of
transmission supplies all that is needed of occupational character.
It would seem to follow that any disease, however exotic, could
become an occupational disease if one could show some method of
transmission peculiar to the employment. Thus, smallpox might
become an occupational disease of a deep-sea diver whose diving
helmet had been used by others, and gonorrhea might become an
occupational disease of lathe operators if they shared the use of
protective goggles. Whether courts will explore the full implications
of this means-of-transmission idea remains to be seen. 6
The ultimate question to which this line of development leads, is
whether sheer proximity to a diseased co-worker, enforced by the
nature of the employment, is sufficient to make a disease occupa-
tional? Michigan and New York are so far the only states to have
confronted this question. Michigan has said yes. New York has said
no. While the Michigan facts were somewhat stronger than those in
either of the New York denials, there may also be a basic disagree-
ment in principle.
All three of the cases involved contraction of tuberculosis. In the
Michigan case, Vanderbee v. Knape & Vogt Manufacturing Co.,87
the peculiar contribution of the employment lay in the fact that a
diseased co-worker had the responsibility of training the claimant,
and, because of the high level of noise in the room, the two were
forced to shout at each other with their heads six inches to a foot
apart. This happened several times a day, for two to five minutes,
over a four or five week period. Within a month after the co-worker
entered a hospital suffering from tuberculosis, claimant's tuberculin
test was for the first time positive.
In the first New York case; Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp.,s
the facts showed only that the claimant worked a few feet away from
86. A similar principle was applied in Hovancik v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 8 App.
Div. 2d 171, 187 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1959). The claimant, over a four-month period, worked with
another technician who had active tuberculosis. He and his diseased co-worker used the same
mouth pipette, probably no more than four or five times. Contraction of tuberculosis was held
compensable as an occupational disease.
87. 48 Mich. App. 488, 210 N.W.2d 801 (1973).
88. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
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a fellow employee who had active pulmonary tuberculosis. In the
later New York case, Paider v. Park E. Movers,89 the enforced prox-
imity was somewhat more pronounced, though by no means as close
as in the Michigan case. Claimant contracted tuberculosis from a
co-employee with whom he was required to share a truck cab. The
court said that this was not a hazard peculiar to a truck driver, but
merely one of this particular job, and therefore was not compensable
as an occupational disease.
The real issue in these three cases comes to this: must the occupa-
tional character of the disease lie in the disease itself, as lead poison-
ing to a lead worker, or can it lie in the fact of proximity that
facilitates its transmission? It seems well established, particularly
in New York, that a common disease like tuberculosis can become
occupational when particular employment devices like mouthpieces
and pipettes play a part in its transmission. In principle, however,
there seems to be no insuperable reason why some mechanical
gadget associated with the job must be involved. The essence of the
occupational character is the marked and enforced increase in the
kind of contact that spreads the disease, beyond normal non-
employment contacts. By this standard, it would not be too difficult
to distinguish Harman and Vanderbee.
The proximity in Harman, although protracted, was no more inti-
mate than that of ordinary human contacts off the job. It is quite
another matter, because of the distinctive employment condition of
loud noise, to have a tubercular co-worker shouting in your face at
the top of his lungs from a distance of six inches.
Somewhere between is Paider, the other New York case. It could
well be argued that Paider is closer to Vanderbee than to Harman.
Being forced to breathe the same air as a tubercular truck driver
within the close confines of a truck cab seems to amount to a suffi-
ciently distinctive employment condition facilitating transmission
to make the disease occupational. In other words, sharing a cramped
truck cab could be analogized to sharing a telephone mouthpiece or
a mouth pipette.
III. EFFECT OF ALLERGY OR PREEXISTING WEAKNESS
A question that continues to elicit some divergence of opinion is
89. 19 N.Y.2d 373, 227 N.E.2d 40, 280 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1967).
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whether a disability produced by the action of employment condi-
tions on claimant's own individual allergy, hypersensitivity or
preexisting weakness is an occupational disease under the general
definition of that term. More than any other single issue, this ques-
tion highlights the difference between definitions aimed at distin-
guishing accident, and definitions aimed at delineating the positive
coverage of the term "occupational disease." In accident-distinction
definitions, one often emphasized feature of an occupational disease
was its prevalence as an ordinary incident of the particular employ-
ment. The disease was sometimes pictured as one to which
practically everybody might succumb sooner or later if he remained
at work under normal conditions for a long enough time.
The fatal impact of this feature of the definition in individual
allergy cases is obvious if it is carried over into the present problem
of interpreting occupational disease coverage. The Missouri court,
for example, relying on accident-distinction definitions, has held
that asthma admittedly caused by prolonged exposure to wheat
dust was not an occupational disease because claimant's own indi-
vidual allergy contributed to the result.9 The court said:
[Tihe asthma or emphysema from which he suffered, even though
brought on by the prolonged inhalation of wheat dust, and even
though not uncommon among people engaged in the milling industry,
was nevertheless not a natural result or incident of the employment
itself, but . . . was attributable to the employee's own individual
innate sensitivity or allergy to the properties of wheat dust ....
Whether any other person would be affected in the same manner as
the employee would depend upon whether he was allergic in the same
manner as the employee."
Maryland has taken the same position, although with a stronger
statutory background than Missouri, which had no statutory defini-
tion. At the time of this decision, Maryland provided schedule-type
coverage with the proviso that no listed occupational disease should
90. Sanford v. Valier-Spies Milling Co., 235 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Mo. App. 1950). Accord,
Watson v. International Milling Co., 190 Kan. 98, 372 P.2d 287 (1962); Olivier v. Liberty Mut.
Ins., 241 La. 745, 131 So. 2d 50 (1961); Picquet v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 77 So. 2d 569
(La. App. 1955); Smith v. Cascade Laundry Co., 335 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. App. 1960); E.I.
DuPont DeNemours & Co. v. Johnson, 212 Tenn. 123, 368 S.W.2d 295 (1963).
91. 235 S.W.2d at 95.
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be compensable unless "such disease shall be due to the nature of
an employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist,
are characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process,
or employment. 9 2 On the strength of this language, the court held
that asthma caused by rubber fumes was not an occupational dis-
ease, since "asthma had never been known to occur as a result of
the operation in which the claimant was engaged, either by the
Kelly-Springfield Tire Company, or by the Goodyear Tire and Rub-
ber Company in its plant at Akron, Ohio."9 3
The majority of jurisdictions, however, have held individual aller-
gies or weaknesses immaterial, where the particular conditions of
employment in fact caused the disability.94 The leading case pro-
mulgating this position is Le Lenko v. Wilson H. Lee Co.,95 wherein,
a linotype operator became incapacitated by dermatitis attributed
to antimony fumes. There had been no other case of dermatitis in
defendant's plant, which had been operating for many years. None
of the testifying physicians had had any experience with such a case,
and medical literature disclosed few examples of it. The court pro-
ceeded on the premise that "the dermatitis of the plaintiff was due
to his individual susceptibility, to an unusual degree, to the fumes
of the antimony."96 The applicable statute defined occupational dis-
ease as "a disease peculiar to the occupation in which the employee
was engaged and due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of
employment as such."9 The court said:
92. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Rowland, 197 Md. 354, 359, 79 A.2d 153, 156 (1951).
93. Id.
94. Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769 (Alas. 1966); Le Lenko v. Wilson H. Lee Co.,
128 Conn. 499, 24 A.2d 253 (1942); Princess Mfg. Co. v. Jarrell, 465 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. App.
1971); Bird v. Pennfield Agricultural School Dist. No. 1, 348 Mich. 663,83 N.W.2d 595 (1957);
Riggs v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 173 Neb. 70, 112 N.W.2d 531 (1961); Stepnowski v.
Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 18 N.J. Super. 495, 87 A.2d 546 (1952); Maniscalco v. Pizza
Chef, Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 884, 233 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1962); Morrocco v. Mohican Stores, Inc.,
16 App. Div. 2d 684, 230 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1962), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1015, 195 N.E.2d 306, 245
N.Y.S.2d 595 (19C3); Berman v. A. Werman & Sons, 14 App. Div. 2d 631, 218 N.Y.S.2d 315
(1961); Mayr v. Price, 9 App. Div. 2d 801, 192 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1959); Horvath v. Wickwire
Spencer Steel Co., 275 App. Div. 1014, 91 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1949); Simpson Logging Co. v.
Department of Labor & Indus., 32 Wash.2d 472, 202 P.2d 448 (1949); Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 239 Wis. 445, 1 N.W.2d 802 (1942). Cf. Silke v. Walter, 69
N.J. Super. 208, 174 A.2d 89 (1961); Rutterschmidt v. Wolff, 14 App. Div. 2d 960, 220
N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1961).
95. 128 Conn. 499, 24 A.2d 253 (1942).
96. Id. at 502, 24 A.2d at 255.
97. Id.
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We cannot import into the conception of occupational disease
under our law the element that the disease must be a usual or gener-
ally recognized incident of the employment. Compensation under our
law is not to be denied because the injury would not have occurred
except for the peculiar susceptibility of the individual worker ...
If. . . a disease is the natural result of conditions which are inherent
in the employment and which attach to that employment a risk of
incurring it in excess of that attending employment in general, an
award of compensation is not precluded because the risk is one which
has not become generally recognized or because only employees unu-
sually susceptible will suffer from it.18
In other words, the test is (1) whether the employment conditions
actually caused the disability, and (2) whether these conditions
were peculiar to the employment in the sense that they were en-
countered there in a degree beyond that prevailing in employment
generally.
The Washington court reached the same result in Simpson Log-
ging Co. v. Department of Labor and Industries"0 under a broader
statute defining occupational disease as "such disease or infection
as arises naturally and proximately out of extra hazardous employ-
ment." '0 The obstacle here was not statutory but judicial, for the
court had before it a definition promulgated in Seattle Can Co. v.
Department of Labor and Industries"' which included the sentence:
"Every worker in every plant of the same industry is alike con-
stantly exposed to the danger of contracting a particular occupa-
tional disease."'"2 The court met this obstacle by admitting that the
earlier definition was inspired by a desire to enlarge the meaning of"accident" by constricting the mutually exclusive concept of "occu-
pational disease." The advent of occupational disease coverage ren-
dered the old definition obsolete, said the court, and a new defini-
tion giving effect to the intention of the legislature in creating occu-
pational disease coverage must be adopted. The new rule, under the
literal wording of the act, is that:
no disease can be held not to be an occupational disease as a matter
98. Id. at 504, 24 A.2d at 256.
99. 32 Wash.2d 472, 202 P.2d 448 (1949).
100. Id. at 477, 202 P.2d at 451.
101. 147 Wash. 303, 265 P. 739 (1928).
102. Id. at 307, 265 P. at 741.
[Vol. 9: 87
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
of law where it has been proved that the conditions of the extrahazar-
dous employment in which the claimant was employed naturally and
proximately produced the disease and that but for the exposure to
such conditions the disease would not have been contracted.ln
Accordingly, asthma from personal sensitivity to the dust, smoke
and fumes of a plywood plant was held compensable.
The rarity of the condition or the allergy does not detract from
its compensability. Few people may have been aware that, to a
person of unusual susceptibility, the inhalation of dust containing
female sex hormones could cause effemination and impotency, but
New Jersey has nonetheless squarely classed this result as an occu-
pational disease.'10
Moreover, the quantitative extent of the exposure is immaterial,
if, in combination with the worker's unusual sensitivity, it was suffi-
cient to produce the disease. In Berman v. A. Werman & Sons,105
minimal exposure to benzol caused an employee's death. Benefits
were awarded for a fatal occupational disease on the ground that
"there is no known minimal amount of benzol exposure which could
not prove harmful . . . to the supersensitive individual. . . ."
Closely related to the question of preexisting allergy is that of
preexisting weakness, disease, or susceptibility. Most courts treat
this problem the same as that of allergies, and hold that when
distinctive employment hazards act upon these preexisting condi-
tions to produce a disabling disease, the result is an occupational
disease.'0 7 Thus when admittedly nonindustrial pulmonary emphy-
sema was aggravated by employment dust and fumes, Oklahoma
concluded that the end product was an occupational disease.1 8 New
Jersey has held that aggravation of a nonoccupational fungoid con-
dition by repeated exposure to benzine constitutes a compensable
103. 32 Wash. 2d at 479, 202 P.2d at 452.
104. Stepnowski v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 18 N.J. Super. 495, 87 A.2d 546 (1952).
105. 14 App. Div. 2d 631, 218 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1961).
106. 218 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
107. Beaudry v. Winchester Plywood Co., 255 Ore. 503,469 P.2d 25 (1970) is a typical case.
Contra, Bess v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 469 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. App. 1971). For a case resolving
administrative difficulties regarding aggravation of an occupational disease, see Schoch v.
State Accident Ins. Fund, 496 P.2d 53 (Ore. App. 1972).
108. National Zinc Co. v. Hainline, 360 P.2d 236 (Okla. 1961).
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disease.' 9 New York has accepted as compensable a low-back strain
caused by continued lifting aggravating a congenitally weak back,""
Dupuytren's contracture in the palms of hands possibly due in part
to a physiological defect,"' and aggravation of preexisting arterios-
clerotic vascular disease.112 Delaware has compensated for aggrava-
tion of a sandblaster's Boeck's sarcoid disease, 113 and Michigan has
added tennis elbow to this category involving preexisting suscepti-
bility.1' 4
It can readily be seen that the line between occupational disease
and aggravation of preexisting disease or weakness had become
blurred. The ultimate working rule that seems to emerge is simply
that a disability which would be held to arise out of the employment
under the tests of increased risk and aggravation of preexisting con-
dition will be treated as an occupational disease.
IV. CONTINUING LEGISLATIVE EXPANSION OF COVERAGE
The expansion of occupational disease coverage by legislative ac-
tion continues, although not always rapidly enough to keep up with
changing conditions and identification of new diseases. Since 1950,
the number of states having occupational disease coverage has
grown from forty-four to fifty, and the number having general cover-
age has risen from twenty-seven to forty-three.
Much of the expansion since 1950 has involved the addition of
various diseases to existing schedules."' This has occurred both in
states where the schedule is exclusive and in those where it is not."'
109. Giambattista v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 32 N.J. Super. 103, 107 A.2d 801 (1954).
Accord, Bond v. Rose Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co., 78 N.J. Super. 505, 189 A.2d 459, aff'd, 42
N.J. 308, 200 A.2d 322 (1963).
110. Buchanan v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 278 App. Div. 594, 101 N.Y.S.2d 1011, aff'd, 302
N.Y. 848, 100 N.E.2d 45 (1951). Contra, Detenbeck v. General Motors Corp., 309 N.Y. 558,
132 N.E.2d 840 (1956).
111. Rogan v. Charles F. Noyes, Inc., 10 App. Div. 2d 765, 197 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1960).
112. Griffin v. Griffin & Webster, Inc., 283 App. Div. 145, 126 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1953).
113. Zallea Bros. v. Cooper, 53 Del. 168, 166 A.2d 723 (1960).
114. Samels v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 317 Mich. 149, 26 N.W.2d 742 (1947).
115. For a complete listing of diseases specifically covered by particular states, see LMsoN
§ 41.70, n.1.
116. Jurisdictions having a schedule in addition to general coverage include: Alabama,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico,
Rhode Island, and Utah. In Virginia the employer may elect schedule coverage.
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The commonest addition has been radiation disease." 7 Sometimes
the results of ionizing radiation have been added to the earlier radia-
tion statutes based on exposures to X-rays and radioactive sub-
stances, and other times radiation diseases are covered for the first
time.
An interesting recent phenomenon has been the burgeoning, in all
parts of the country, of statutes granting special compensation cov-
erage to firemen or policemen, or both, for respiratory and heart
diseases connected with the exertions of the employment."18 No two
statutes are quite identical. Most establish a presumption of work
connection when these diseases result from performance of active
service, a presumption that cannot be rebutted merely by evidence
of preexisting heart disease"9 nor by medical opinion that the occu-
pation had no effect on the weakened heart.2 ' All sorts of special
qualifications, conditions, exceptions, and provisos have been fes-
tooned upon the basic model, including minimum periods of service,
full-time status, pre-employment examinations, and the like. Inev-
itably questions of extent of coverage have arisen, which have been
dealt with both by judicial interpretation 12 and sometimes by legis-
lative enlargement of the range of persons protected. Thus, Minne-
sota started with members of organized fire departments in 1955; in
1957 added members of organized police departments; then in 1959
the highway patrol; and in 1963, members of the game warden serv-
117. All states now have some coverage of diseases due to exposure to radioactivity, either
through full-coverage statutes, or through specific addition to the schedule, or both. See, e.g.,
Besner v. Walter Kidde Nuclear Lab., 24 App. Div. 2d 1045, 265 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1965)
(decedent had been exposed to radiation on several occasions. Medical testimony was given
that there was no safe dosage, since medical science did not know the exact effects or radia-
tion, and each individual reacts differently. Award for death caused by radiation-induced
acute myeloblastic leukemia affirmed).
118. Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 18 Cal. App. 3d 852, 96 Cal. Rptr.
279 (1971).
119. Turner v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 258 Cal. App. 2d 442, 65 Cal. Rptr.
825 (1968); Bussa v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 259 Cal. App. 2d 261, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 204 (1968).
120. Sperbeck v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 46 Wis. 2d 282, 174
N.W.2d 546 (1970).
121. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 251 Cal.
App. 2d 772, 59 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1967) (claimant, a deputy coroner who served as a part-time
deputy sheriff, was not one of those the legislature intended to include in this coverage);
Buescher v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 265 Cal. App. 2d 520, 71 Cal. Rptr. 405
(1968).
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ice and State Crime Bureau. 22 One state, North Carolina, has held
such provisions invalid as class legislation.'2
V. SPECIAL OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE RESTRICTIONS
In most states the benefits for occupational diseases, and the
conditions controlling compensability, are the same as for other
kinds of disability. In spite of a marked trend toward abolition of
special restrictions in recent years,2 4 there remains a significant
number of states which retain special provisions affecting occupa-
tional diseases, and especially dust diseases. Eight states, for exam-
ple, place unusual limits on medical benefits for silicosis, asbestosis,
and other occupational diseases. 2' There are also to be found special
rules on benefits for partial disability, periods of exposure, and time
of death or disability following exposure. In view of the persistence
of this substantial array of restrictive provisions, a brief review of
their background may be useful.
The original reason for these restrictions was the fear that the
compensation system could not bear the financial impact of full
liability for dust diseases, simply because they were so widespread
in particular industries. As investigators began to examine the gran-
ite works, mines, quarries, foundries, monument works, and other
establishments where silica dust was prevalent, they discovered
that almost every employee had silicosis in one stage of develop-
ment or another. When a state introduced full silicosis coverage, it
might discover, as Wisconsin did, that the insurance premium for
monument workers, for example, promptly soared higher than the
payroll itself, with the result that the entire industry was closed
down. To some extent this problem may be thought of as a tempo-
122. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.011 (Cum. Supp. 1974). See, e.g., Schwartz v. City of
Duluth, 264 Minn. 514, 119 N.W.2d 822 (1963); Gray v. City of St. Paul, 250 Minn. 220, 84
N.W.2d 606 (1957).
123. Duncan v. City of Charlotte, 234 N.C. 86, 66 S.E.2d 22 (1951).
124. At one time, twenty states placed special restrictions on payments for silicosis, ashes-
tosis, and other dust diseases: Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia.
125. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1314(b) (1960); 48 ILL. ANN. STAT. § 172.43 (1966); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-5a10-5a14 (1973); REv. CODES MONT. ANN. § 92-1311, 13, 16, 27 (Cum. Supp.
1973); NEv. REv. STAT. § 443.145 et seq. (1973); GEN. STATS. N.C. § 97-52 et seq. (Supp.
1973); OHIo REv. CODE § 4123.68 (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1005, 1007 (Cum Supp.
1974).
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rary one because of the backlog of advanced cases left over from an
era of poorer preventive methods and less complete understanding
of the disease. Some states nevertheless met this problem by intro-
ducing a sliding scale of silicosis benefits which would reach full size
in a number of years, by barring benefits for partial disability, and
by throwing up a variety of barriers based on relation of time or
degree of exposure to time of disability, death, or claim.
What happened, however, was that these makeshift measures,
contrived to tide employers and carriers over a transitional diffi-
culty, remained ingrained in compensation acts long after their rea-
son for existence had diminished or disappeared. As early as 1950,
one commentator stated:
We no longer are seeing new cases of silico-tuberculosis except in
the older workers who were exposed to the heavier dust concentra-
tions in the past.' 6
The persistence of this unsatisfactory situation led to a dramatic
attempt in Michigan to have the special statutory limits on silicosis
benefits struck down as unconstitutional.12 The essence of the
claimant's argument-a theory with fascinating implications for
constitutional law in general-was that a statute which might have
been constitutional when passed could become unconstitutional by
the disappearance of the conditions whose existence had made its
original enactment necessary. The constitutional provision chiefly
relied on was the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The claimant argued that the maximum limit of $6,000 for
silicotic disability created an arbitrary, unreasonable and discrimi-
natory classification. The court, although sympathetic toward the
claim, held that it was beyond its power to apply this reasoning to
the instant case because at the time the decedent's rights accrued
the classification was not obsolete. It is interesting that the court
apparently did not rule out the possibility of reconsidering this line
of attack in some future case in which the evidence on obsolescence
would be stronger. The court said:
126. Address by Dr. O.A. Sander at the 36th Annual Convention of the I.A.I.A.B.C., DEP'T
OF LABOR BuLL. No. 142, p.51, "Workmen's Compensation Problems, 1950."
127. Gauthier v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co., 360 Mich. 510, 104 N.W.2d 182
(1960).
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Any argument that the scheme is now "obsolete" as to future disa-
bilities must wait consideration on a record which presents facts from
which it might be deducted that the legislative reasoning had lost all
value with the passage of time and change of circumstances [citing
cases] .'2'
One of the most common types of restrictive provisions bars
claims unless the disability or death occurred within a specified
number of years after a specified event such as the last day of work
for the particular employee 21 or the last injurious exposure. 3 ' The
arbitrariness of these statutes and their exceptions has produced
senseless discrimination. For example, under the Utah statute, the
three-year limitation in death cases is replaced by a five-year period
if death results from a continuous total disability "for which com-
pensation has been paid or awarded."'' In Pacific Coast Cast Iron
Pipe Co. v. Industrial Commission,132 death benefits were denied the
widow because, although the employee had actually applied for
compensation during his lifetime, the Commission had never gotten
around to passing on his claim before his death. It was conceded
that the claim would have been granted, but because of nonaction
beyond the control of either the employee or his widow, the literal
terms of the statute were not fulfilled. 3
The key operative concepts affecting the various silicosis limita-
tions vary so much from state to state that no overall generalizations
about their definition are possible. Some involve the interpretation
of such terms as "injurious exposure"'' 34 and "last employer."'"
Other terms that may require definition are "date of disability,"
which is often related to the cessation of actual work,' "contraction
128. Id. at 522, 104 N.W.2d at 188.
129. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-2-13 (Supp. 1973).
130. E.g., COLO REV. STAT. § 81-18-10(g) (1963) (within five years of last injurious expo-
sure). See Graber v. Peter Lametti Constr. Co., 293 Minn. 24, 197 N.W.2d 443 (1972);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Gray, 4 Pa. 590, 288 A.2d 828 (1972).
131. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-2-13 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
132. 118 Utah 46, 218 P.2d 970 (1950).
133. For a detailed discussion of this and other restrictive limitations, such as rigid require-
ments of exposure during a specific period prior to disablement or death, see LARSON § 41.80.
134. Turner v. State Compensation Comm'r, 147 W.Va. 145, 123 S.E.2d 880 (1962).
135. Czepukaitis v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 203 Pa. Super. 493, 201 A.2d
271 (1964).
136. Piragowski v. National Sugar Refining Co., 11 App. Div. 2d 824, 202 N.Y.S.2d 611
(1960); Fetner v. Rocky Mount Marble & Granite Works, 251 N.C. 296, 111 S.E.2d 324 (1959).
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of silicosis," which has been held to refer, not merely to the physical
fact of inhalation of silica dust, but to the development of observ-
able symptoms, 3 and "compensation," which has been held to in-
clude medical benefits. 118 Similarly, the range of diseases or condi-
tions embraced within the "silicosis" provision will depend both on
the words chosen by the legislature and on its intent. The term"silicosis or other dust diseases" has been held to include pulmon-
ary emphysema from various substances including silicates, 139 but
not blindness attending sinusitis and rhinitis caused by dust,"'
since this was obviously not a part of the problem at which the
restrictive legislation was aimed. And when the statute provides
that the disability be caused by uncomplicated silicosis or that sili-
cosis be an "essential factor," it has been held insufficient to show
that the claimant's total disability was caused largely by tubercu-
losis and, to a minor extent, by silicosis.11'
The general trend toward liberalization of occupational disease
provisions has been most marked in connection with statutes requir-
ing disability or death to occur within a specified period after last
exposure or employment. Some of these relaxations apply to occu-
pational diseases generally;4 2 many apply to silicosis and related
diseases;4 3 and most, at least as to the limitations periods, have
dealt with the special problem of slowly developing radiation injury,
sometimes accompanied by other latent injuries.144 The commonest
137. Yaeger v. Delano Granite Works, 236 Minn. 128, 52 N.W.2d 116 (1952).
138. Bayless v. List & Clark Constr. Co., 201 Kan. 572, 441 P.2d 841 (1968).
139. Whitt v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 1 Mich.App. 494, 136 N.W.2d 734 (1965)
(claimant contracted pulmonary emphysema from exposure to calcium carbonate, aluminum
oxide, and various forms of silicates. The court held that this type of dust was included within
the term "silicosis or other dust diseases" and claimant's recovery was limited by this section
of the statute). See also Mills v. Princeton Mining Co., 133 Ind. App. 486, 183 N.E.2d 359
(1962); Habovick v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 207 Pa. Super. 80, 215 A.2d 389 (1965).
140. Felcoskie v. Lakey Foundry Corp., 382 Mich. 438, 170 N.W.2d 129 (1969).
141. Stockdale v. Sunshine Mining Co., 84 Idaho 506, 373 P.2d 935 (1962).
142. See, for example, statutes in the states of Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, and West Virginia.
143. Statutes exist in the following states: Colorado, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Utah.
144. See statutes in the following states: Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin. See generally the excellent discus-
sion by Estep & Allan, Radiation Injuries and Time Limitations in Workmen's Compensation
Cases, 62 MICH. L. REv. 259 (1963).
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change is to make time periods run only from knowledge, real or
constructive, of the condition and its relation to the employment,
at the same time often removing or extending considerably the abso-
lute outside time limits on the filing of a claim.
A common restrictive clause is that omitting or limiting benefits
for partial disability caused by occupational or dust diseases.'1
Where partial disability is noncompensable, and at the same time
claimant is barred unless he makes claim within a specified time,
the stage is set for what could be another seemingly unavoidable
pitfall for the silicosis victim: the possibility that this condition may
not develop beyond partial disability within the period of limita-
tions, and that therefore there might appear to be no moment in
time when he could ever make a valid claim. This trap was success-
fully avoided, however, by an Oklahoma claimant who simply filed
his claim within the statutory period in spite of the fact that at the
moment of filing the condition, only partially disabling, was non-
compensable. He then used the added time available for a reopening
petition for change in condition to get his case heard when total
disability in fact ensued. "'
In line with the general trend toward liberalizing the treatment
of occupational diseases is the removal of abosolute benefit limita-
tions in New Jersey, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Flor-
ida. It may be noted that there also is some movement in the direc-
tion of removal of the ban on partial disability benefits for occupa-
tional diseases generally, as in Colorado and Vermont, or for silicosis
and related diseases, as in Michigan and Florida.
In about half of the states, the provisions on second injury funds
145. For a listing of the 19 states having some such limitation, together with interpretive
cases see LARSON § 41.80 n.47. See also Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Carter, 224 Md. 19, 165 A.2d
902 (1960) (held that a permanent partial disability award, but not a total disability award,
is in order when claimant was reassigned duties away from exposure to silica dust in order to
prevent further injury).
146. Southwest Stone Co. v. Washington, 381 P.2d 872 (Okla. 1963). After filing, claimant
became totally disabled and applied for a re-opening of the claim. The court held that in such
a case the claimant was correct in filing a claim within the one-year time period following
exposure after the condition became known. Although not compensable, his petition to re-
open for change of condition, upon attainment of a compensable state of disability, was
controlled by the statute of limitations applicable to reopening, 500 weeks, and not the shorter
period for filing original claims. Denial of compensation, based upon the original decision of
noncompensability, was vacated and remanded.
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are sufficiently broad to appear to cover preexisting occupational
disease;147 in other states such as Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, and
Ohio, occupational diseases have specifically been brought within
the second-injury fund procedure. In New York there is a special
fund for dust disease cases, under which, in the event of total disa-
bility or death from a dust disease, the employer is liable for a
limited number of weeks, and the fund is liable thereafter, regard-
less of any previous condition or disability. Special provision for the
state or for the subsequent injuries fund to bear part of the cost in
certain cases has also been made in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and
California.
In a few instances, silicosis and similar diseases are singled out
for the purpose of adding rather than subtracting a benefit. New
York, for example, provides special hospital care and medical treat-
ment for silicosis. Since it is highly desirable for employees in early
but nondisabling stages of illness to get out of the dusty environ-
ment, several states provide benefits to such workers who leave or
change jobs for this reason. In Idaho, South Dakota, and Wisconsin,
the provision applies only to silicosis. In Arkansas and North Caro-
lina, the allowance extends to both silicosis and asbestosis, and in
Ohio to silicosis and coal miner's pneumoconiosis.
VI. THE "BLACK LUNG ACT"
Dissatisfaction with restrictions and inadequacies of state com-
pensation acts in the area of pneumoconiosis, of the kind just dis-
cussed, resulted in an extraordinary resort to federal power to rectify
the situation or induce the states to do so.
On December 30, 1969, President Nixon signed the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 ("Black Lung Act") .148 This law
is primarily designed to establish nationwide health and safety stan-
dards for the coal-mining industry. It also includes an income-
maintenance provision that is quite unusual since for the first time
it gives the federal government at least temporary responsibility in
a traditionally state administered area of workmen's compensation.
Under Title IV of the Act, monthly cash benefits are provided for
147. See LARSON § 59.32.
148. Coal Mines Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C.A. § 901-36 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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coal miners who are "totally disabled" because of pneumoconiosis
("black lung" disease), and for their dependents and survivors,
when death either was due to pneumoconiosis or occurred while the
miner was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis. Full medical bene-
fits as well as rehabilitation benefits were added by the 1972 amend-
ments.'49
"Pneumoconiosis," for the purpose of these benefits, is defined as
a chronic dust disease of the lung arising out of employment in a
coal mine.'5 ° If a miner who is suffering or has suffered from the
disease was employed in one or more underground coal mines for ten
or more years, there is a rebuttable presumption that his disease
arose out of such employment.15' If a deceased miner was so em-
ployed and died from a respiratory disease, there is also a rebuttable
presumption that death was the result of the disease. If a miner is
suffering from or dies having an advanced irreversible state of pneu-
moconiosis, it will be irrebuttably presumed that he is totally dis-
abled or his death was caused by the disease. 15 2
Two federal agencies-the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare and the Department of Labor-are involved in administer-
ing the cash benefit provisions. The Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare (through the Social Security Administration) is
responsible for the payment and administration of benefit claims
filed by living miners on or before December 31, 1973. The Depart-
ment of Labor has responsibility for claims filed by miners after
December 31, 1973.
In addition, the program provides that if a claim is filed after
149. The addition of medical and rehabilitation benefits is the result of an almost invisible
change in the statute. In Sec. 422(a), there is a long list of 26 numbers representing the
sections of the Longshoremen's Act that are not incorporated by reference, both in the stan-
dards to be applied by the Labor Department when directly handling claims, and in the
criteria that states must meet to take over administration of these cases. In 1972, the number
"7" quietly disappeared from this list of numbers. This was a lucky seven for the miners, since
its deletion gave them full medical benefits for life, as well as rehabilitation benefits-this
being what Section 7 of the Longshoremen's Act provided.
150. Coal Mines Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C.A. § 902(b) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
151. If the employment period was 15 years or more, the presumption applies, under the
1972 amendments, even if there is a negative chest X-ray. Coal Mines Health and Safety Act,
30 U.S.C.A. § 921(c)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
152. These presumptions are collected in the Coal Mines Health and Safety Act, 30
U.S.C.A. § 921(c) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
[Vol. 9: 87
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
June 30, 1973, but on or before December 31, 1973, the claimant
would receive benefits from the Social Security Administration only
through December 31, 1973. Thereafter the employer is responsible
for payment of these benfits. The benefits will continue indefinitely
for miners who filed for benefits before July 1, 1973, and widows who
filed before January 1, 1974, as well as for widows on the death of a
miner who was a beneficiary under the program.
Benefit payments to a miner or his widow are reduced if the
beneficiary is also receiving payments on account of his disability
under a state's workmen's compensation, unemployment insurance,
or disability insurance program.
The Act also includes a "maintenance of effort" provision under
which any reduction by a state in its workmen's compensation,
unemployment insurance, or disability benefits for persons eligible
to receive the "black lung" benefits will result in a stoppage of the
federal payments to residents of that state. The benefits are not
retroactive-that is, no benefits are paid for any period before the
date on which a claim for them is filed.
For benefit claims filed after 1973, overall responsibility for the
program shifts to the Department of Labor. Such claims will be
processed under state workmen's compensation acts in those states
with laws that are approved by the Secretary of Labor as providing
adequate coverage for pneumoconiosis. 53 Generally speaking, a
state law will be determined to have adequate coverage for pneumo-
coniosis if the cash benefits under such law and the criteria for
determining eligibility are not less favorable to the claimant than
those applicable to claims under the "Black Lung Act."
Where a state workmen's compensation law does not have the
approval of the Secretary of Labor, coal mine operators will be liable
for payment of benefits that are to be secured through self-insurance
153. The Act requires that the Secretary of Labor publish, not later than October 1, 1972,
a list of states providing the requisite coverage. The Secretary duly published a notice that
no states were up to standard. As of March 1973, there were still no laws that had been
officially approved as being in compliance, in spite of a considerable flurry of legislative
activity inspired by this Act in Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky, Montana, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The inability of the Secretary to certify compliance
with minimum criteria was perhaps understandable, in view of the fact that no regulation
fixing criteria had been published at that time.
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or purchase of an insurance policy. In such cases, the benefit levels
are to be the same as those provided under the federally financed
part of the program, and subject to a number of specified excep-
tions, are to be made under the same conditions that would apply
if the claim were subject to the provisions of the Federal Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Where payment
from a coal mine operator or his insurer cannot be obtained, the
Secretary of Labor will make the payments to which a totally disa-
bled miner or his dependents are entitled under the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act.
The Department of Labor is authorized to issue regulations pur-
suant to the Act. These regulations fall into two main parts. The
first set of regulations covers the procedures and rules applicable to
the direct handling of claims by the Labor Department.'54 The sec-
ond set contains the criteria that state statutes must meet to qualify
for taking over this class of cases.'55
VII. CONCLUSION
There is no mystery about what needs to be done to eliminate the
worst deficiencies in occupational disease protection. The solution
is simply to cover them all by a blanket inclusion of occupational
disease, and to abandon the practice of covering only listed diseases,
unless such lists are themselves followed by a catch-all clause em-
bracing all other occupational diseases. It is gratifying that the
movement in this direction has been one of the most conspicuous
areas of compensation reform in recent years, but a number of tragic
omissions and limitations inherited from the past still remain to be
remedied.
A strong new force, federal government pressure, is now operating
on this problem in two ways. The first is the recommendation of the
National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws
calling for (among other reforms) complete occupational disease
coverage, and for federal action to "guarantee compliance" with this
standard by any state that has not done so by 1975. The second
development is the advent of the "Black Lung Act," with its im-
154. 20 C.F.R. § 725 (1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 16962 (1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 26042 (1973); 38 Fed.
Reg. 12494 (1973).
155. 38 Fed. Reg. 8328 (1973).
[Vol. 9: 87
1974] OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 119
plicit hint that it can easily be extended by the addition of a few
words to any other occupational diseases that state laws have un-
duly neglected.
Between the legislative improvements resulting both from the
existing momentum toward change and the two-pronged push by
Washington, and the judicial expansion of the occupational disease
concept occurring in most states, it may well be that we shall wit-
ness, within a few years, the kind of complete occupational disease
protection that compensation acts in theory should have provided
from the very beginning.

